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1. The authors are academics at the School of Law, University of Surrey.  
This evidence is submitted in a personal capacity.  Given that a further call 
for evidence will be made when further details are available about the 
Government’s negotiations, this submission primarily addresses issues 
arising from the Europe Minister’s oral evidence presented to the 
Committee on 16 September 2015.
Introduction
2. At the outset, it should be recalled that the aim of getting a ‘fair deal for 
the Britain’ from the ongoing renegotiation process is one of the Juncker 
Commission’s declared priorities.1  Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the 
Union speech, delivered on 9 September, reflected on the ‘strategic 
importance’ of the outcome of the forthcoming referendum for the Union 
as a whole,2 emphasizing that the UK’s membership is better for both the 
UK and the EU.  As President Juncker has observed, continued efforts to 
modernize the EU and to strengthen its capacity to respond to challenges, 
are efforts which are in the interests of all 28 Member States.  
3. A number of issues raised by Mr Lidington as key issues in the negotiation 
process already feature in the European Commission’s policy agenda.  As 
such, the Minister has not raised issues that are not already well known 
and where concerns are not restricted to the UK. In the authors’ view, 
reform on the main areas addressed by the Minister – at least, to the 
extent that negotiation is likely to be acceptable to all other Member 
States - would not constitute a transformation of the UK’s relationship with 
the EU.  
Comments on the terms of reference
4. The terms of reference appear to overlook the recent Balance of 
Competence review, despite the salience of its outcomes for the current 
negotiation process.3  We suggest that a reference to it is included if a 
further consultation on the UK Government’s plans to renegotiate EU 
membership is announced by the Committee. 
Renegotiation Issues raised by Mr Lidington
1 J-C. Juncker, State of the Union 2015, speech delivered on 9 September 2015, 10.  
Accessible at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5614_en.pdf >.2 Ibid.3 Review of the Balance of Competences (2012-2014); reports available at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/review-of-the-balance-of-competences>. 
5. According to the Minister’s oral evidence of 16 September 2015, the areas 
covered by the renegotiation broadly include: the single market; the 
Eurozone versus non-Eurozone Member States divide; sovereignty; and 
free movement and access to benefits. No information was provided on 
the UK Government’s red lines. 
i) The single market
6. The Minister’s points in relation to the single market are predominantly 
policy-related and chime well with the current policy agenda of the 
Commission.  For instance, the Minister talks about reducing red-tape and 
exploring new trade agreements. He also elaborates on current policy 
including competitiveness and job creation. These are points summarised 
by Juncker in his recent State of the Union address.  
7. The further development of the single market, in which all 28 Member 
States have a stake, is clearly an area of vital importance for the evolution 
of the EU.  This is an area which should be developed through a coherent, 
wide-ranging and innovative reform agenda, rather than focusing on 
isolated reforms and compromises in the context of the UK negotiations, 
and accelerating isolated changes in a sectoral way.
ii) Eurozone vs non-Eurozone Member States divide
8. The Minister does not seem to appreciate the rationale for monetary 
union. There is scope to refine the relationship of Member States 
participating in the EMU and those which remain outside it (since they all 
participate in the single market). However, the Minister’s remarks about 
integrating economic policy for EU Member States further, while 
preserving the integrity of the single market, demonstrates a lack of 
appreciation of the current dynamics in the Eurozone. Furthermore, the 
Minister makes a series of criticisms which lack any concrete examples of 
current deficiencies or unfair treatment prejudicing non-Eurozone states.
9. The Minister makes the paradoxical point of an ‘ever-closer union’ which 
at the same time permits scope for Member States to differentiate. This 
paradox has become a mainstream narrative, to the extent of being 
institutionalized by EU officials, such as President Juncker.  Having said 
that, the future of the EMU - in the light of the financial crisis - remains an 
area of contention and something that merits every Member State being 
involved in a thorough evaluation and agreement on any future 
Treaties/Treaty changes, where necessary. This is important for two 
objectives: First, to refine the relationship between Eurozone and non-
Eurozone Member States and second, to improve the overall 
effectiveness of Eurozone governance. 
iii) Sovereignty
10. Sovereignty has always been a contentious issue relating to EU 
membership for all Member States.  On the specific issue of strengthening 
the role of national parliaments4 through building on the yellow/orange 
card mechanism provided by Lisbon, this Committee has already heard 
evidence on the Dutch and Danish parliaments’ proposals to which Mr 
Lidington referred.5 Whilst legislative reforms to this process would not 
adjust sovereignty in a constitutional sense, reinforcements to the system 
could usefully provide enhanced opportunities for the views of national 
parliaments to influence the legislative process at EU level. This would 
undoubtedly serve the interests of increasing accountability and drawing 
decision-making processes closer to citizens. In the meantime, the ‘green 
card’ initiative – executed for the first time in July 2015 – represented a 
constructive political engagement between national parliaments and the 
European Commission.6 In terms of legislative reforms in this area, it is 
currently unclear whether, and to what extent (if any), proposals on this 
issue from The Netherlands, Denmark and other Member States will be 
taken forward.
11. The Minister does not mention how the European Union Act 2011 is going 
to play out in the current ‘renegotiation’. Section 18 (Sovereignty Clause) 
and Sections 2, 3 and 6 (Referendum Locks) are most relevant to the 
discussion. On the one hand, the ‘Sovereignty Clause’ which provides that 
EU law has no authority in the UK in its own right confirms the primacy of 
EU law over domestic norms, which, in the case of the UK, has a statutory 
origin: The European Communities Act 1972. On the other hand, the 
Referendum Locks provide for a broad range of situations where a 
referendum can be held in the UK, inclusive of instances where the 
Government agrees to change the current Treaties, or certain EU 
legislative acts pertaining a wholesale transfer of power to the EU. More 
guidance on the practical effect of the European Union Act 2011 on the 
relationship between the UK and the EU, as well as its impact upon our 
courts and the legislature would be beneficial in the current debate. For 
instance, would a referendum under the European Union Act 2011 morph 
into a ‘Brexit’ referendum?
12. Finally, the Minister could explore further the UK’s prospects of future 
recourse to Article 4(2) TEU in respect of national identity, which is akin to 
national sovereignty. In spite of the availability of the identity clause, the 
UK has not yet made use of it. The Supreme Court has, however, 
implicitly qualified certain national provisions as encapsulating part of the 
country’s constitutional identity. In doing so, the Supreme Court has 
resorted to a unilateral assessment of which cases are to be considered 
internal and, therefore, to be decided at home behind closed doors and 
which cases are to be up for discussion with the CJEU. The above logic 
4  See especially D. Chalmers’ oral evidence on strengthening the role of national 
parliaments; ESC – Minutes of Evidence, HC 109-II – accessible at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmeuleg/109/130904.htm>.5 See for example, ESC, 24th Report of Session 2013-14, ‘Reforming the European Scrutiny 
System in the House of Commons’ HC 109-I.6 ‘Food waste: a proposal by national parliaments to the European Commission’, letter co-
signed by 16 Chairpersons of national parliaments of the EU, 22 July 2015; accessible at: 
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-select/green-card/green-card-on-
food-waste.pdf>. 
was recently confirmed in the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the HS2 
case.7
iv) Free movement and access to benefits
13. Free movement does not appear to cause concerns for the Government 
as long as the person exercising his/her Treaty-based rights to free 
movement is not an economic burden on the state. Indeed, even the 
CJEU appears receptive to arguments about the need to maintain the 
financial equilibrium of the national social security system.  In Dano (Case 
C-333/13) and Alimanovic (Case C-67/14), the CJEU backtracks 
somewhat from its previous, more liberal case law.  In Dano, the CJEU 
held that Member States may exclude from entitlement to social 
assistance EU citizens who arrive in their territory without intending to find 
a job. In Alimanovic, the CJEU held that EU citizens who travel to a 
Member State of which they are not nationals in order to seek 
employment may be excluded from entitlement to certain social benefits. 
This apparent trend seems to be in synch with the Government’s view on 
the matter of free movement viz. access to social benefits. 
14. The Prime Minister believes that success in the above four categories will 
amount to fundamental change in our relationship with the EU.  Given the 
unlikelihood of many (if any) reforms being achieved via Treaty change in 
the near future, the likelihood of secondary legislation or alternative 
instruments being used, and the prospects of reforms being made in any 
event as a result of the Commission’s policy agenda, we suggest that this 
reform programme – on the basis of the limited information available – is 
unlikely to constitute the fundamental change the Prime Minister 
envisages.
Conclusion
15. The Government needs to be more transparent about the genuine 
likelihood of having a Treaty renegotiation as this is not on the horizon in 
any practical sense prior to the 2017 referendum.  In effect, the UK’s 
power of negotiation to attain reforms that are, in the Prime Minister’s 
words, ‘legally binding and irreversible’, is relatively limited given the 
closeness of the referendum date. Past experience demonstrates that 
renegotiations involving Treaty changes take an extensive length of time 
because they require unanimous approval by national parliaments.  The 
six year gap between the entries into force of the Treaties of Nice and 
Lisbon was due to the protracted negotiation processes and delays in 
Member States approving Lisbon.  If pursuing reform via Treaty changes, 
the UK Government should be upfront about the likelihood of the 
referendum occurring with the promise of future Treaty changes, rather 
than delivering them in the near future.
16. On the other hand, the Minister does not exclude the possibility of 
achieving reforms through secondary legislation. The Government 
7 R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd, Buckingham County Council and others) v Secretary of State for 
Transport [2014] UKSC 3.
appears open-minded about the range of instruments available and is 
prepared to take the advice of the EU Institutions about the appropriate 
instruments. In any event, secondary legislation will be sectoral, only 
producing relative gains for the UK.  Secondary legislation would be 
inappropriate for achieving the kind of fundamental reforms to the UK-EU 
relationship which the Government appears to seek.
17. One would imagine the Government should present its ‘deal’ and full 
details of the results of the renegotiation process well in advance of any 
referendum, to provide sufficient time for parliamentary debate, 
Committee scrutiny and informed public debate.  An opaque negotiation 
process, leading to a fait accompli to be presented to parliament and the 
public is evidently the manner in which the present Government wishes to 
redefine the UK’s position in the EU.  Such a deal would, presumably, not 
be subject to further changes prior to a referendum without further 
negotiations with the EU institutions and Member State governments.  
18. According to the Minister, ‘it is not unreasonable for the elected 
government’ to negotiate and then come back to Parliament with a final 
deal.  This appears to negate any input from the Committee or the public 
influencing the process of renegotiation.  As such, the input of parliament 
and the public in the process would be negated.  In our view, this 
approach is disappointing and marginalizes the role of the public on an 
issue of central importance to the strategic political and constitutional 
future of the UK.
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